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Derek Hillard 
Violence in Mind and Body: Jünger’s Heart, Brecht’s Brain, and Döblin’s Hand 
 
When we interrogate depictions of violence, we characteristically seek to uncover 
how violence is glorified, aestheticized, hence legitimized.1 Unsurprisingly, this focus 
suits an approach that is both predominantly hermeneutic and devoted to reading texts as 
historically and ideologically symptomatic, because scholarship traditionally treats 
violent depictions as positions in moral, ethical, or political discourses.2 Crucial to such 
investigations are often questions about perpetrators or victims. In this line of inquiry, a 
leading, if unasked, question is how would one analyze this depiction if it were reality. 
Emerging into view, then, is a paradoxical cohabitation of fascination for the spectacular 
with the insistence on a corresponding real. The question of legitimacy is informed by an 
imperative that would run something like this: react to violence as if it were always real, 
according to the maxim that your reaction would become universal.  
 Consider the extensive research on violence. We might expect critical appraisal to 
echo the famous juridical threshold for obscenity: we know it when we see it. Noting that 
this is not the case, the film scholar Marco Abel proffers a “Spinozist provocation,” 
namely, “We do not even know what violent images are, let alone how they work.”3 To 
assume that the stakes in violence always concern the characters, acts, and reality as 
content might get in the way of a more probing consideration of this question. Showing 
similar prudence, interdisciplinary theorists point out the difficulties in discussing such 
“an extremely complex phenomenon involving major ambiguity between the destruction 
and the creation of order.”4 Yet it is not merely a question of quiddity but of modus and 
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locus: where is violence and how do we know it? 
The established lines of inquiry alone are not sufficient to account for ways of 
looking at violence. A symptomatic approach assumes an efficient fixity of act, actors, 
and ideologically received representation, one supported by a reliance on the concealed 
real. A formalist investigation may intrigue not only because it eschews the ubiquitous 
causal outrage but also because it reminds “that fictional violence exists only by virtue of 
the imaginative shaping and transformations of an author’s touch.”5 Nevertheless, by 
focusing on intention and authorial imagination, the formalist view overlooks readers and 
the question of mind and body. A Deleuzian framework, such as that of Abel, yields 
insight into the possibilities of finitude, but does its dependence on the trope of deferral 
not seem obligatory?6 To take investigations of violence to the next stage, do we not need 
to locate a role for the reader’s imagination?  
***** 
In a 2000 essay collection, Karl Heinz Bohrer noted that “we look predominately 
upon violence as literary and artistic content, but do not ask ourselves about the form.”7 
Artists present violence because its formal expression accommodates the impulse for a 
style that “jolts” or “wounds” readers.8 In this approach we see not just a shift to the 
question of form, one developed in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s suggestive study of Louis-
Ferdinand Céline, published in the same collection, in which the reader “feels himself 
ever more remorselessly hounded by this prose.”9 We also see a renewed exploration of 
aesthetic experience and the autonomous status of the work. 
Informed by cognitive cultural studies or “bioculturalism,” critics from other 
camps have begun to examine more closely experience in the context of art.10 Cognitive 
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literary studies track in various ways. Much of this research studies what texts can reveal 
about mental states as represented in the work; other research looks for what texts can 
reveal about how our minds represent. Some descriptions of narrative in these fields 
argue that the same underlying processes are involved whether listening to a real person 
or to a narrator, in which the element of fictionality is downplayed, undertheorized, or 
dropped altogether.11 In the words of Monika Fludernik, “Readers construct meanings 
and impose frames on their interpretations of texts just as people have to interpret real-
life experience in terms of available schemata.”12 It is often assumed that readers regard 
the narrator as if she were a real person, in which the story is an encounter, as it were, 
with a real voice.  
The notion that narratives are products not of authors but readers is a theory often 
associated with Roland Barthes. Presaged by early German Romantic theory and 
Nietzsche, this notion is also present, I argue, in works of German modernists such as 
Alfred Döblin. Due to the rich history of reader-oriented theory, cognitive readings make 
new claims not by referring to the “making something a narrative by the sheer act of 
imposing narrativity on it, [which] needs to be located in the dynamic reading process,”13 
but by basing this process in natural schemas and cognitive frames, such as action, 
narrativity, or experience.14  
Despite the arguments made for natural schemata, the theories do have a 
weakness. Such schemata are not directly experienced, only their surface manifestations 
in linguistic references or embodied indexes. If everything can be traced to a natural but 
unseen basis, then differences cannot emerge on this natural level. Distinctions only 
emerge when we examine the phenomena accessible to perception, phenomena that may 
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or may not be natural. Available schemata, universals, frames and so on are imagined as 
untainted by the constructivist forces at work in imagination, science, and myth (power), 
so that constructivism is acknowledged on the basis of the schemata but not for the 
schemata themselves, which are conceived as unconstructed. At the same time, the 
concept of fictionality is at times abandoned without sufficient consideration, while the 
difference between spoken and written speech is often downplayed. 
Though reading has reemerged as an area of significant interest, literary critics 
have not yet studied violence or its ties to emotion in the context of readers.15 To do this, 
we will need to ask what the relationship of body and consciousness is to violence in the 
context of the aesthetic. Such an investigation would not have an etiological, 
symptomatic, or juridical focus, but emphasize instead where and how narrative violence 
occurs and speculate about what particular, case-based reader reactions could be. This 
approach shifts the focus from the work as an autonomous entity with a ready-made 
profile of violence to one animated by the reader’s consciousness and perhaps registered 
by the body.  
 Thus my first hypothesis is that the investigation of violence in literature is at its 
most insightful and accounts for indispensable elements when it sees how particular 
violence conjoins with the ways in which it is aesthetically experienced. Without the 
perceiving mind, violence in the work could not be fashioned. In this essay, the goal is 
not to examine a model of images (whether treated as real events or not) that have been 
fixed in autonomous fashion but to explore a dynamics of violence that is implicated in 
the experience of reading.16 As I will discuss, the subject is at once violence and at the 
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same time the reader, who emerges as the one who does violence and the one to whom it 
is done. 
Accordingly, this essay investigates three different models of reader reception of 
violence in works of three writers of the Weimar Republic era: Ernst Jünger’s early 
works, particularly Wäldchen 125 (Copse 125), Bertolt Brecht’s Die Maßnahmen (The 
Measures Taken), and Alfred Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz. To get at the ways in 
which minds and bodies experience violence in writing, I would like to investigate both 
bodily metaphors and also the purported use-value of violence.17 This intention relates to 
my second hypothesis: Weimar Republic aesthetics were profoundly drawn to the 
question of violence’s possible use-value.  
The three works in question, as my final thesis has it, conceive of at once different 
models of violence and at the same time different models of reader reception. The first 
model assumes a human continuum with nature, which results in a bodily identification 
with violence depicted as naturally autonomous (Jünger). Against this, the second model 
strives to make readers into sites of calculation, so that violence both depicted and real 
can be changed—yet its efforts result in a mixture of constructivism and identification 
(Brecht). By contrast, the third model assumes violence is embedded in the reader, which 
emphasizes how the reader’s perception is reintroduced into the object of reading as 
violence (Döblin). Common to each is a reliance on bodily metaphors—respectively, 
heart, head, and hand—which frame the bodily appeal to the reader’s situation. This 
essay, then, differs from most approaches to violence by analyzing body and 
instrumentality to get at the reader’s role in the construction of violence.  
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The Heart: Jünger's Wäldchen 125 
In Ernst Jünger’s war narrative Wäldchen 125 (1925), a diary of trench warfare in 
1918 France, violence is instrumentalized through the figure of sacrifice as a means to 
achieve sacral selfhood in the framework of nation. At the same time, the narrator 
contends that instrumental, economic, and utilitarian considerations of sacrifice offer a 
proof that the self who enters into this economy achieves sacral authenticity. In this way, 
the economic dimension props up a self that can be asserted only through its willingness 
to surrender to violence. Self-generation requires a sacrifice in the service of a sacral 
national mission.  
Before coming to the issue of the reader in Wäldchen 125, violence must first be 
considered. Much can be said about the economy of violence at stake in this narrative: it 
is not merely one figure among many but the one that occupies the human core.18 For the 
narrator, the new European man of World War I was born on the battlefield, and the man 
of the future will also need to be made there. The will to sacrifice is the decisive factor in 
the construction of the new man, a man whose death and birth are conceived as one 
event. In a phrase that is telling for his entire output of this period, Jünger wrote how 
sacrifice connects death’s past and future to its present: “There, where such blood has 
flowed, is where an inheritance is assumed and beginnings are to be seen. Whether the 
war is won or lost: that has not happened in vain.”19 At the same time, in Jünger's works, 
one key area of tension is that between violence perceived in aesthetic, that is, 
subjective—versus collective and political—terms, a concern that bears on the role of 
consciousness in the construction of violence.  
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Regarding this violence: on the one hand, the pre-1935 editions of Jünger’s text 
refer to the goal necessary for the new self to emerge in violent sacrifice—“the formation 
of all Germans in the future Reich of millions, for which it is worth dying and breaking 
all opposition.”20 Jünger asks, "If young men have no great aim then why should they 
sacrifice themselves?”21 The source for this will may come from society, for instance, 
from education, public displays of memory, art, family, or philosophy. However, despite 
their powerful intentions, none of these social sources can generate an authentic will to 
fight and die, because this will, resting on sacrifice for its imagination, is religious: “The 
outer symbol that draws it forth is sacrifice.”22  
On the other hand, this particular employment of violence does not saturate its 
meaning. Particularly in his later writings and editions of the 1930s, Jünger tried to empty 
the myth of a goal or content, a gesture that has been neglected in much of the 
scholarship.23 While the instrumentality of violence is strongest in the early texts under 
consideration here, they too reveal a direction the later texts would take. In this 
connection, one sees how in works such as Wäldchen 125, “Der Kampf als inneres 
Erlebnis” (Battle as an inner experience) (1922), and Feur und Blut (Fire and Blood) 
(1925), the fight itself supplies a primordial timelessness, whereas the particular 
motivation for violence is contingent. For instance, in Feur und Blut, battle “occurs not 
for us, not for our nation, not for the group of nations allied with us. It occurs for the 
earth itself.”24 Most telling in this respect is the description of value and determination by 
the narrative voices of Wäldchen, Feuer, and “Kampf als inneres Erlebnis.” The 
justification is not a matter of morality but one of the battlefield ethos of agon. One kills 
in battle not those for whom one has no respect, not those who are not worthy of life, but 
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on the contrary, the most respected.25 What emerges in the place of the noble cause and 
the division of combatants into manifestations of good and evil is the value placed on 
becoming hallowed through the fight.  
To an extent this tension is reconciled: while Jünger’s construction of violence 
involves a central ecstatic experience, this experience is put to use time and again via the 
symbol of sacrifice in the cause of nation or the production of authenticity. At the same 
time, Jünger’s ecstatic battlefield sacrifice is not a mimetic representation of nature or 
death, one that would then find an aesthetically mediated presentation for a reader or 
listener, a matter to which I will return presently.  
Why violence occurs is a significant question for the consciousness of readers. 
For this is also to ask what role the observing consciousness has other than the imposition 
of a narrative frame. Jünger’s works are replete with references to war and violence as 
natural. For instance, in “Kampf,” the narrator writes that “War is no more a human 
institution than the sex drive; it is natural law.”26 Similarly, in Blätter und Steine (Leaves 
and Stones), Jünger writes, “[J]ust as war is not a part of life, but the expression of life in 
its full violence, so this life is in itself fundamentally warlike.”27 Battlefield situations 
allow humans to be the agents of the greatest and most heroic acts.28 Yet war is at all 
times clearly part of human consciousness and the body. The narrow field of action for 
humans is encapsulated in the ability to bring their own will into accord with nature 
through “sacrifice, whose basis is the highest freedom.”29 In doing so, they become 
something more than mere nature: “Everywhere in this war we are brought into contact 
with the miraculous; we sense driving powers beyond consciousness, a mighty will, to 
which we are apt to surrender ourselves.”30 In the struggle for survival and the assertion 
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of culture, the choice to fight is a tactical advantage. Violence will erupt, and those who 
choose to join battle and choose wisely can live beautifully and intensely and perhaps 
enable a culture to thrive. We cannot change or overcome the natural law of violence; but 
we can master our relationship to it, just as we can master our relationship to pain.31 The 
manner in which subjects will face violence is essentially the only area of action 
remaining open. Why is violence exercised? For Jünger, it is an innate human drive, one 
located in a vague continuum of mind, body, and cosmos—the only route to self and 
spirit. 
Thomas Weitin has shown how in the effort to present war as natural—the early 
writings position themselves as a direct registration of war—Wäldchen 125 aims to efface 
the medium of the literary text by claiming its earliest battlefield notations are 
impressions of natural events.32 Yet I not only wish to stress how nothing is left for the 
witness but to observe the “wavy line of a Seismograph” that tracks combat, but even 
more so, to mark a corresponding gap for the reader in Jünger, one that scholarship has 
not yet touched.33 
I wish to discuss this by examining a well-known scene in Feuer und Blut, which 
Jünger rewrote in successive publications.34 Critics have persuasively argued for the 
centrality of allegory and sight in Jünger’s oeuvre.35 Yet in stressing the role of the heart 
in this oft-reworked passage, I wish to point out how it becomes a trope for deflecting the 
visual and a means for imagining reader impact. Constructed as an imitating recipient of 
real violence, the narrator serves as a model for the imagined reader. The episode 
concerns an explosion that lands in a trench, wounding and killing a dozen soldiers, 
leaving a “throng of bodies that writhes like an amphibian in a boiling lake.”36 Neither 
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the sound nor sight of the blast but the way in which vision is transferred to other bodily 
systems freezes the narrator's body: “Your heart wants to turn this image away, yet, in all 
its horror, takes it in.” The image of ruined bodies is quickly routed over the mind 
straight to the heart, which asserts an interdependence of sight and inner organs. 
Although the narrator wishes to stress the power and primacy of the visual, impulses of 
the body take command, at first by trying to resist and finally by taking over the work of 
the eyes.  
Because the wounded bodies are placed into intolerable states and spaces—
animals in an undifferentiated and agitated liquid state—they immobilize the participant. 
He recognizes them (as human bodies) in their unrecognizability (as mass of inhuman 
stirrings). Indeed, the soldiers’ destroyed bodies cannot be captured in an image because 
their effect is not limited to the visual. Having become first imprinted in the narrator’s 
brain, they are then translated into a body experience localized in the heart. This heart is 
not a metaphor merely for emotions but also for the body as contractile, muscled force to 
which the cognitive-visual has yielded. Having supplanted the eye, the heart wants to 
shut itself off, but it cannot—something from the outside has manifested itself within in 
the form of passive stasis.  
What interests me here is not how the author or narrative voice fortifies itself 
against purportedly real traumatic war-effects, but how Jünger’s texts imagine a 
“fortified” reader. The reader should construct a world of natural violence in which he, 
like the narrator, is placed. By shifting the mode of reception from visual to cardio-
muscular, the text aims to register a bodily impact, with the heart behaving like a 
chamber that will contain acts of presentation.37 Unable to repel identification with 
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suffering, the body surrenders to the heart’s passivity. The text becomes a cardiograph for 
nature.   
This scene also acknowledges how the narrator-reader is an inextricable part of 
the violence, not as its construer, and not because he fails to intervene, but as part of 
natural phenomena due to his role as mirror of violence. The affected body in the scene 
does not offer a significant position for the reader, only a passive reception. If we are to 
adopt the narrator’s perspective, we are repulsed with him at what he feels, but the only 
act is flight or fright. Though demanding a response, the narrative blocks it through the 
observer’s muted gesture. In the final step, the scene is recuperated to a natural event.  
Mirroring the naturality of procedures and their representation, Jünger’s narrators 
of the interwar era envision no significant active role for the consciousness that 
apprehends the text. In works such as Wäldchen 125, Feuer und Blut, or “Der Kampf als 
inneres Erlebnis,” the violence depicted is not regarded as dependent on readers or the 
“narratee.” This objective element to violence rests not on the chronicalistic status of the 
works but on the notion of readerly consciousness informing them.38 Soliciting 
recognition, the narrator in Wäldchen 125 presents events that are totally coherent and 
fashioned as if they were cut from reality. As such, they purport to be the direct 
manifestations of deeply rooted natural phenomena. As a result, the narrator envisions a 
reader who views the story as an event that is at once strange, experienced by another, 
and at the same time familiar, natural, and objective. The reader is not asked to narrate 
the other but to recognize the self in the other. For instance, in a section near the 
narrative’s climax, the raging battle for the fighters in the copse becomes a “cosmic event 
[…] before which the people […] play a minor and meaningless role.”39  
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This can be appreciated when we recall that nature and mysticism make good 
bedfellows. Because violence conceived as nature relies not on human actors for its being 
but on passive observers, the socio-political dimensions can be ignored to the benefit of 
religious ones, which are as impersonal as nature. As a result, cosmic violence enables 
the production of an authentic self through the subordination of the will. Once produced, 
this self can justify itself through the aesthetic or be put to use in the service of the nation. 
The role of the fighter mirrors that of the reader in Jünger: the reader is to adopt 
the protagonists’ sense of wonder at the manifestation of natural violence. Accordingly, 
everything is mobilized so as to situate the reader geographically in violence as a 
surrounding natural landscape. How readers will actually respond to the narrator’s efforts 
at emplacement is an open question. The reader may adapt the stance of the protagonists, 
wondering at the sublime natural rhythms of violence, or turn from them as literary 
fantasy. In any case, the reader’s intended role is to inhabit the cartography of destruction 
without imagining that narrator and violence are reader-dependent for their being. Invited 
to recognize itself as a transeunt part of an inter-subjective mind, the mind knows 
violence before it externally encounters it. Indeed, the reading mind appears as a 
pullulating element of violence in its cosmic expression, a part that recognizes itself in 
the purported other of nature. In a twist reminiscent of Hegel’s treatment of spirit, violent 
nature appears as an infinite self-reflecting subject, one that becomes manifest through its 
particularization in the minds of finite creatures.40 
 
 Athletes of the Mind: Brecht’s Die Maßnahmen 
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For Jünger, violence depends on the passivity of readers. Characters are of 
concern only with regard to attitudes toward violence, not to its event. As a result, the 
narrative voice frequently presents violence as framed by or bound up in a choice, in 
which it is the chief field for attaining selfhood. Because violence is key to selfhood, it 
can be economized and instrumentalized for such purposes as nation.  
Literary historians typically place Jünger in the camp opposite Brecht,41 who does 
not share with Jünger the view that violence is at once natural and at the same time a 
means of authentic self-presentation. Yet just as violence in Wäldchen 125 or Feuer und 
Blut is not without an instrumentalization, which is central in Brecht, its presence in Die 
Maßnahmen (1930/1931) is not without a concern with the self, a feature shared with 
Jünger. In Die Maßnahmen, this self is only fully actualized in the moment that it can 
merge with the community by being willingly killed. David Pan has recently stressed 
sacrifice as public phenomenon in Brecht’s work.42 According to this view, death 
becomes a profound public act, allowing the production of a social self in death denied in 
life, where ego-centrism prevents the unfolding of a developed self. Hinting at this 
notion, the control chorus stresses at the play’s conclusion how social change can occur 
only through the “comprehension of the individual and the whole.”43 Centered in the 
death of the Young Comrade, the paradoxical interdependency of self and community 
points to a commonality with the early Jünger, a commonality resting on the shared view 
of violence in economic terms. 
If Die Maßnahmen belongs, as Brecht stated, to those “suppleness-exercises” 
(Geschmeidigkeitsübungen) so that “athletes of the mind” (Geistes-Athleten) become 
“good dialecticians,”44 then practice relevant to violence is the core embodied mental 
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maneuver. The preparations for this mental exercise are laid in the opening of the play, in 
which the killing of the Young Comrade is reported: “The Control Chorus: Who killed 
him? / The Four Agitators: We killed him. We shot him and cast him into a lime-pit.”45 
The remainder of the play narrates the possibilities of response for the performer/viewer. 
In the logic of the Lehrstücke (learning plays), the viewer should take the perspective of 
the chorus, whose judgment (Urteil) is sought about the acts of the Four Agitators and the 
Young Comrade.46 The viewer’s role is to judge judgments.  
Indeed, Die Maßnahmen amounts to a sort of training in the cognitive processing 
of violence. One member of a band of revolutionaries agitating in China, the Young 
Comrade, repeatedly errs and jeopardizes the mission by displaying sympathy and 
impulsive emotional expression instead of cold calculation. As a result, after convincing 
the Young Comrade of the appropriateness of the act, his comrades kill him so as to 
preserve the body politic and keep the cause alive. For the political body of the 
revolutionary movement to live, it must be prepared to sever a limb, in which life must be 
destroyed for the future community: “And so we decided: we now / Had to cut off a 
member of our own body / It is a terrible thing to kill.”47 Players and viewers—with his 
Lehrstücke Brecht famously aimed to eliminate the barrier separating these stances—
weigh actions to learn the economy of violence.  
In the view of Die Maßnahmen, we need to accept violence at present so that 
there might be an end to it: “For violence is the only means whereby this deadly / World 
may be changed.”48 Rather than accepting this, the Young Comrade rejects the economies 
of destruction and is undone by the contradiction of individual and collective. As a result, 
he becomes the sacrifice; for sacrificed are not only the current victims and their 
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situations but also the ability to act based on feeling and the here and now, which 
explicitly characterizes him. While critics dutifully stress the didacticism of such scenes, 
the comrade’s death nevertheless has the effect of a calculated exchange whose aim is to 
efface the distinction of aggressor and victim. The other agitators mention three times 
that they will first shoot the Young Comrade and throw him into the burning lime pit 
(Kalkgrube). Once lying there, covered with limestone, he recalls a ritual immolation and 
sacrifice:  
 Then we shot him and 
 Cast him down into the lime-pit 
 And when the lime had swallowed him up 
 We turned back to our work.49  
Recalling how Kalk forms the etymology of the word calculation, we see how this 
“work” drives home the concern with instrumentality. 
Jünger’s narratives of violence aim to restrict readers’ representational 
movement—boxing them in, so to speak, so as to preserve a traditional focus on heroism 
and nature, which aims to use the body for nature-empathy and shock. By contrast, in Die 
Maßnahmen, the control chorus asks its viewers/readers (and performers) to contemplate 
turning sacrifice into a site of calculation: can the rite be used as a tool of political 
violence to overturn its necessity? 
The exercises in violence-cognition are not just represented in the play; they are 
also to be completed in the consciousness of the viewer/reader. Die Maßnahmen is a 
frame-story in the form of a dialogue structured as an inquiry. The narrator could be said 
to be the Control Chorus that interrogates and receives the story of the participants within 
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the frame narrative. Die Maßnahmen aimed to accomplish a transformation of 
viewer/actor from one who, like the Young Comrade, behaves emotionally and opposes 
sacrifice to one who gains practice in sacrificial thinking and action, that is, one who can 
weigh gains against losses and decide accordingly. By jettisoning those limbs (severing 
“one’s own foot from the body”) susceptible to contradictory and paradoxical actions, 
one hopes to preserve the body politic, and the greater aim of social revolution comes 
closer to realization through this economic act.  
Yet the prominence of the analytic betrays an underestimation of embodied 
imagination in viewership.50 How viewers responded to Brecht’s Maßnahmen has been 
documented: they reacted emotionally to the fate of the Young Comrade. While Brecht 
famously envisioned critical responses emphasizing understanding and meaning, 
responses that eschewed identification and empathy, Antony Tatlow shows how viewers 
of the play from the 1930s to the 1960s frustrated this expectation.51 That the play cues 
viewers to empathize—at once with the Chorus in its role as judge and at the same time 
with the Young Comrade in his role as sacrifice—can be seen in the words of the Chorus 
as the Four Agitators report their killing of the Young Comrade: “We sympathize 
[Mitgefühl] with you. / It was not easy to do what was right.”52 Why this shift from 
reasoned judgment to emotion?53 Does killing lie on the far side of judgment where affect 
prevails? Brecht’s locating sympathy in the Chorus with the Four Agitators as the 
empathetic object was designed to draw empathy away from the Young Comrade. Yet 
this very structure of sympathizing with the sympathizer instead allows the 
performer/viewer to sympathize with the Young Comrade, an event that squarely locates 
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violence in viewing: in the act of sympathizing with viewers, the secondary viewer (or 
performer) carries the violence in her mind and body. 
That the text asks the performer to empathize with the killers is less significant 
than its inability to draw away viewers’ identification with the killed. Finding the 
violence malevolent, capricious, and repugnant, viewers and performers rejected it, and 
in doing so reproduced the affective stance of the Young Comrade. Their reaction betrays 
a resemblance to the ancient understanding of tragedy, which derives not mainly from 
interpretation but impact. Despite Brecht’s repudiation of Aristotelian focus on emotion, 
and in the face of critics’ fealty toward the Brechtian program, above the play hangs an 
air of the tragic. 
In this regard, Brecht’s experimental aesthetic of the Lehrstück anticipates 
concerns of cognitive reader-centered aesthetics by decades. Brecht too regards the work 
as a pragmatic progressive construction instead of as an autonomous inalterable work. 
Yet Brecht located constructivism in the work itself, in formal externality, by which I 
mean in an altered iteration of the play as a result of a critical intervention.54 This was 
envisioned as a reaction to dynamic social processes, not to invariant biological features. 
Brecht did not foresee that the viewer might react by constructing an internal image of 
the body marked by violence on the stage. Yet it may be the case that this viewer will 
represent, as it were, for her mind an “emotional body state,” one that simulates the 
violent body on the stage as if it were her own.55 If this is the case, then Brecht’s repeated 
efforts at altering the play in reaction to the viewers so as to block certain kinds of 
emotion were complicated due not to the work but to the body.  
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Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz 
As we saw, Jünger’s Wäldchen 125 constructs text as copse where shell-shocked 
acquiescence is the only impact. By contrast, Brecht’s play aims at once to portray a 
complex social reality and at the same time to appeal to analytical faculties. While 
Jünger’s Wäldchen does not engage with the notion of the animating reading 
consciousness at all, Brecht’s Maßnahmen offers a violent formality for the mind to 
reconstruct. Yet the real status of the represented images of violence is never in question, 
as the violence is assumed to exist recognizably outside consciousness.  
In this context, Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929) is unique for figuring 
violence as perception and impact, which is also to say, for collapsing the distinction 
between the narrated and narratee. The notion that violence has a symbolic character is a 
commonplace.56 Unique is that Berlin Alexanderplatz extends violence to include the 
perceivers’ acts of shattering and reorganizing the material it perceives. The novel carries 
this insight into its bursting linguistic plenitude. Violence thus operates in conversation, 
advertising, song, politics, religion, myth, and economy in such a way that it experiences 
transference from languages about violence to an efficacious progressive perception as 
violence. In this account, violence is not restricted to representations of powerful 
destruction. Instead, we perceive violence because it is an ineluctably distinguishing act 
that (cognitively and bodily) creatively destroys. Berlin Alexanderplatz anticipates Abel’s 
comment that it is not yet known “what violent images are and how they work.” Yet 
instead of proposing an account of violence on par with a Deleuzian deferral, Döblin’s 
novel regards violence as a bracing and efficacious perceptual impact. Berlin 
Alexanderplatz does not just move the reader but does so by making her feel as if she is 
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the agent of destruction. The domain of presentation in the novel joins with a reading that 
must bring vast, active resources—sight, touch, and sound—to bear so as to perceive and 
sense the evermore-extending space of fractures and at the same time to violently wrest 
an ordered space from the fractured. 
Critics have seen violence in Berlin Alexanderplatz in terms of a productive 
sacrifice or trauma, and as primarily directed against women.57 For other critics, both the 
city and the body of the protagonist Franz Biberkopf emerge as indexes of urban and 
social violence.58 Each of these approaches stresses not only representational content but 
also character agency. Let us take the discussion to the next stage by examining what role 
the consciousness and affect of the reader plays in the production of violence, and how 
the novel reflects on this. 
Agency is commonly understood to be a fundamental component in the 
consideration of violence, which is thus conceived in terms of collective or 
individual/private.59 In Berlin Alexanderplatz, agency is not a central concern. While the 
segments with Biberfkopf and his psychotic friend Reinhold as “wounders” of bodies 
form a dense narrative strand, they occupy only a small quantity of Berlin Alexanderplatz 
as a text. Likewise, collective violence, while often hauntingly evoked in martial ciphers 
and images of battlefield carnage, remains marginal. Indeed, for all the fascination with 
Berlin Alexanderplatz’s individual acts of violence and their colorful perpetrators, its 
main concern is not with subjects who do violence to each other—regardless of whether 
subjects are conceived as freely capable of making decisions or controlled by urges and 
emotions.  
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Instead, the dominant violence is one of impact and communication. One can also 
consider it in terms both anonymous and autonomous.60 Anonymity can, as Bernhard 
Waldenfels argues, be conceived in terms of the embodiment in a body that is never 
entirely our own.61 But this does not account for the materiality and linguistic nature of 
violence. For that, we also need an embodied mind that actively participates in the 
novel’s discourse. Emphasized is aggression not accountable in terms of causality and 
explanation but in terms of discourses, media, reading, and technology, as well as a kind 
of violence that a reader finds adhering in the formal dimensions of narrative, a matter I 
will come to shortly.  
As we have seen, despite their differences, both Brecht’s Maßnahmen and 
Jünger’s period texts see violence in a useful economy—Jünger with regards to the 
aggrandizement of the authentic self, Brecht with regards to goals of community and 
social progress.62 Violence as waste in Berlin Alexanderplatz is in stark contrast to its 
role in Die Maßnahmen and Jünger’s works from the around the same time. This is in 
part due to narratological assumptions. In narrative terms, neither the characters nor their 
acts of violence in Berlin Alexanderplatz move the action forward as they do in Brecht or 
in classic city novels. Instead of emphasizing character intentionality, Berlin 
Alexanderplatz places great weight on the constructed city, the reader, and the book as 
terrains of signs.   
 Examples of violence as uselessness are numerous in Berlin Alexanderplatz: the 
beatings and deaths of Mieze and Ida, the great changes to old Berlin, citations from 
Greek tragedy and the Bible, the slaughterhouse scene, the loss of Franz’s arm, which is 
at the core of the “violent cure” announced by the narrator.63 The most compelling plot-
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based evidence in the case for violence as waste, which can also be called the aesthetic, is 
Biberkopf’s death, a death that tenaciously refuses agendas of empathy, tragedy, or 
Bildung. Violence is never involved in a successful instrumentalization, not even for the 
generation of a self. The novel shares concerns of autonomy and sovereignty with the 
works of Jünger and Brecht yet displays significant differences: for there violence is 
instrumentalized for the production of a robust “metalicized body.”64 This is to say that 
Berlin Alexanderplatz takes a much more nuanced and deliberately complicating 
approach to its concern with sovereignty of the self over and against violence in the age 
of the machine, an approach implicated in Döblin’s concept of epic literature. Violence in 
Döblin is neither efficient nor mobilized. Rather it is open to chance; contradictory, it is 
capricious, luxurious, and wasteful. Accordingly, Berlin Alexanderplatz feints with the 
Bildungsroman, a tale of a modern man who progresses from willful pride to humanistic 
autonomy with a place in the community, only to push the reader outside the ring of the 
productive. The novel’s narrative of enlightenment through the renunciation of myth and 
violence is structured by a contradiction. It purports to depict the maintenance of an 
enlightened self, yet this self must rely on violence to overcome the power of mythic 
violence.  
The ends of both narrative and protagonist get at the question of use-value and 
violence. In particular, the novel’s logic suggests that the instances of cool, calculating, 
and often violent exchange, to which Maria Tatar skillfully draws our attention,65 is 
overcome with the conscious surrendering of the self. Indeed, with staggering variety, the 
motif of giving, giving away, exchanging, and sacrificing, characterizes the actions of 
Döblin’s figures. Clytemnestra, in whose life the central event is sacrifice, appears via 
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paraphrases of Greek tragedy; the recitations of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, are vivid, 
and the male figures—Franz, Reinhold, Herbert, Lüders—repeatedly engage in various 
kinds of gift-giving. Foremost in the sacrificed body is Biberkopf's arm, one rich in 
significance.66 Certainly Döblin considered self-surrender to be part of sentient beings’ 
natural condition, as he wrote in Das Ich über der Natur (The I Above Nature): “Giving-
away rests within ourselves; we age, die.”67 The nobility of violent sacrifice, mobilized 
from the tragic language of the Bible and Greek antiquity, would seem to be an attempt to 
dignify, overcome, even short-circuit the brutal exchange principle at work in the text. 
Confronted with death, Biberkopf is ready to yield himself, to remove himself from the 
chain of exchanges and enter into the true gift: “He who lies here and offers up his life 
and his body is Franz Biberkopf.”68 Yet cool exchange and the surrender of the self or of 
body parts do not lead to a greater good, as does Brecht’s severing of the limb, but 
merely to more force.   
Many scenes reveal the novel as a travesty of the Bildungsroman. For instance, in 
its fragmenting, breaking, chopping, and immolation the self mimes an initiation, a 
rebirth as a mature subject: “Now we must describe what pain does to Franz Biberkopf. 
Franz does not resist, he surrenders and gives himself up as pain's victim. He lies down in 
the blazing flame in order that he may be slain, destroyed, and burnt to ashes.”69 This 
passage reads like a parodic condensation of rites of passage familiar from ethnographers 
such as Arnold van Gennup, where novitiate are removed to the forest—here, the insane 
asylum, Buch70—and, in the words of van Gennup, “subjected to seclusion, lustration, 
flagellation, and intoxication” followed by “transition rites, including bodily mutilations 
(circumcision).” Finally, “Since the novices are considered dead during their trial period, 
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they go about naked”—“They speak a special language and eat special food.”71 A 
comparison with such ethnological accounts emerges: “Without a stitch on,” force fed 
“milk and eggs and bit of cognac,”72 Biberkopf spoke “a few words, opened his mouth, 
sighed or groaned, although nobody was able to make anything of these sounds.”73 
Though a powerful urge to perceive the narrative along natural or developmental lines 
may be in play for readers, the goal of a fully developed self is abandoned for the sake of 
an unstoppable pendulum of creation and destruction.  
 While bodies in Berlin Alexanderplatz register violence in striking ways, violence 
is less done by Döblin’s figures than it is embodied in them. So Reinhold, who, like all 
the characters of Berlin, finally, “is through playing his role,” as the epic narrator 
playfully remarks at the book's conclusion, appears as “cold force” (Gewalt), an allegory 
of violence.74 Indeed, Reinhold emerges as the cold brutal epiphenomenon of the post-
humanist age as theorized in Döblin’s essay “Der Geist des naturalistischen Zeitalters” 
(“The Spirit of the Naturalistic Age”). Likewise, in his “Das Ich über der Natur,” a work 
that he closely associated with Berlin Alexanderplatz, Döblin characterized the drive 
behind life as an anonymous animating force (Gewalt).75 In his efforts at conceiving of 
world and self without the subject-object dualism, violence for Döblin becomes the world 
manifesting itself for a body and mind to perceive it. 
While anonymous violence has already formed the world for us, we can recast it, 
albeit not according to our will. Unlike Brecht, for whom analysis and institutional 
constraints are central, or Jünger, who stresses natural urges, Döblin emphasizes this 
recasting according to limitations due to bodily organs—including limbs and sense 
organs—which have been restructured from preexisting forms and together now construct 
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a “Zertrümmerungsapparat” (fragmentation apparatus).76 Similarly, in “Der Geist des 
naturalistischen Zeitalters,” he writes of “the other organ-systems and brain parts” that 
had atrophied in the metaphysical age and that are now activated in the materialistic-
technical era— the “muscles, eyes, ears and their neuropsychical projections.”77 
Previously decisive only in war, these organs have now generally transferred their martial 
training in the age of technology. Activated and extended by technology, the senses place 
the body and psyche in a state of constant conflict. At the same time, the city as body is a 
form of extended cognition: “The new spirit turns cities into its body.”78 The agents of 
violence are conceived no longer as humanistic subjects of the metaphysical era but as 
bodies of destruction. Because this age witnesses the merging of city and book, Berlin 
Alexanderplatz materializes as a body for its violent and animating spirit, one that is 
recast in its fractures and fractures things so as to recast them.  
 
Arm and Hand 
Regarding this recast body, Walter Benjamin remarked that the overwhelmed 
reader of Berlin Alexanderplatz remembers two central (violent) events: Mieze’s murder 
and the loss of Biberkopf’s arm.79 Indeed, the arm is implicated in the novel’s key formal 
distinction, for Arm has the etymological meaning of to join, which is to say that the 
counterpoint at work in question is one of joining and breaking.80 This subsumes the 
visual concept of montage, which Benjamin saw as the novel's “stylistic principle.”81 
Linking story, character, language, form, and terrain, violence as perception is more 
comprehensive than montage, for in its Döblinian sense, it is the unity of the difference of 
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creation and destruction, a unity that marks all bodies, including the hand as both subject 
and object.  
Consisting of cuts, fragments, and breaks, the lyric form of the novel embraces 
what I would like to call literary Fraktur. With this metaphor I wish to denote the 
particular ways in which meaning and form are merged in the novel. Etymologically, 
Fraktur, “a break,” derives from Latin fractura, “a breaking,” and frangere, “to break.”82 
Referring in the history of medicine to a broken bone, it is linked to the word “fragment” 
and “fracture,” and also conveys destruction. As a kind of typesetting, it signified the 
angular and “broken” type of Gothic as opposed to the round type preferred in Latin 
style. Due to the distinction of Latin versus the German of the common people, it came 
further to signify plain, German-language speech. Fraktur thus can be used to collect 
several strands together in the novel: fragmentariness, the broken body (Franz’s arm), the 
visual and tactile quality of print, directness, destruction, violence, trauma, and violation. 
Most significantly, Fraktur collapses the distinction between text and violence. Through 
reading the broken script, the reader becomes both agent and witness to the violence done 
to bodies and texts.  
 As a kind of cutting-machine, this Fraktur-book transforms its force, its Gewalt, 
through the course of the narrative, producing characters, meaning, and events, 
explaining for instance, why death’s hands wield the cleaving axe against Franz’s body. 
Indeed, as the narrator puts it: “It [the dark power, death] speaks Fraktur with him.”83 
Death explains Franz’s errors, that is, it speaks clearly, violently, and in German—
meanings of Fraktur. Following the other meaning, this dark violence, “redet Fraktur,” 
speaks the broken script, which is to say in a chopped and chopping manner of 
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signification and perception. This script of destruction routinely enunciates itself, often in 
the form of self-replicating language drills: “I beat everything to pieces, you beat 
everything to pieces, he beats everything to pieces.”84  
Such linguistic transformations run parallel to the alterations to city space such as 
Alexanderplatz, the square about which Benjamin remarked in his review of the novel: 
“the site where for the last two years the most violent transformations have been taking 
place […] where the innards of the metropolis […] have been laid bare to a greater depth 
than anywhere else.”85 Berlin Alexanderplatz is creating a new kind of literary Fraktur, 
one that intersects distinctions of narrative, religion, human relations, economy, politics, 
and space in the repetitive effects of pushing, breaking, and fracturing. Its aim is not to 
move the story but the reader.  
Central to this metaphor of Fraktur is the metonymic suggestion of the hand and 
arm that both writes, signifies (pointing), destroys, and is destroyed. The loss of 
Biberkopf’s arm, the tool of violence against Ida and Lena, results in an empty space, 
which suggests that the novel itself wishes to become a hand in its place. By considering 
the hand—Döblin’s and that which a reader imagines in and behind the signs placed on 
the page—we can understand violence differently.86 Instead of conceiving of violent 
representations, we are asked to imagine a manual gesture embodied in the work. Here it 
is worthwhile to note not only the rhythmic interjections of the various texts in the novel 
but also Döblin’s compositional practice, which consisted of manually pasting cutout 
snippets of newspaper and other found texts directly onto the manuscript. I want to 
suggest that not only in the novel’s thematic and formal dimensions, but also in the 
genetics of its material, we can see destructive and creative movements. In particular, in 
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the fractured form of the novel, we glimpse the movements of the hand that writes the 
line, cuts out the newspaper notice and pastes it onto the manuscript, like the hand that 
has left a brushstroke on a canvas or the thumb that has molded clay into an image. Our 
tactile eyes become fingers tracing these gestures. In this way, Berlin Alexanderplatz is 
an exemplary handbook of violence. 
 The difference introduced by Berlin Alexanderplatz can be appreciated by 
considering episodes of impact from the novel, for instance the scene in the cinema with 
Herbert and Eva: “In the third act when the noble hero is apparently killed by a bandit, 
Eva sighs. And when Herbert looks her way, she's just about to slide off her seat, and she 
faints, imagine it.”87 In Eva’s reaction, the wounded body she observes on the screen 
becomes part of her experience. Yet the novel’s Fraktur unsettles to a greater degree. The 
jolt that is delivered in the narration of Ida’s violent death lies not in the physical 
destruction depicted, but in the force of irony and fragmentation directed at the reader: 
“Thanks to such timely consideration, we can dispense entirely with Furies. We can 
follow, step by step, what Franz did and what Ida suffered. There is no unknown quantity 
in the equation.”88 Science brusquely shoves the genres of sympathy, myth, and tragedy 
aside. In the scene of Mieze’s brutal murder the charge of her death cuts to a different 
tone in the description of the slaughtered calf, in which Mieze’s story yields to 
administrative recipes for the killing of animals. This cannot be entirely attributable to a 
reference to the unspeakable and thus recuperable to the story of the characters.  
What is the source for this Fraktur and why does this matter? One can point to 
many candidates, including new media such as film and radio, architecture, and of course 
montage and the city itself. Music stands out, and this is crucial for two reasons. First, the 
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novel uses pain and violence as musical phrases so that the reader can construct patterns 
of listening.89 At issue is not meaning but the particular relations between musical 
ciphers. This explains Döblin’s frequently stated similarity of music and prose, calling 
“word-art a temporal art like music,” one that shares key rules of “rhythmic structuring, 
repetition, summations of equinumerous movements.”90 Second, Berlin Alexanderplatz 
draws on music for its experience of an emerging present, wherein the modern epic can 
resemble symphonic works in which “succession of movements” creates the work’s 
developing impact.91 The time of epic narration has its pendant in musical time: “Themes 
develop musically not just by themselves elsewhere, but rather truly in time, they emerge 
precisely now.”92 They emerge now, I contend, because they result from our reading as 
the reception of a telling. The action centers on the pragmatic scene, in which both 
speaker and addressee are being narrated. For this reason, the musicality draws not so 
much on modern technologies of radio and film but on the ancient technology of the body 
as a chamber of sounds and sensations.93 Regarding musical Fraktur, the connections 
between the novel’s parts are not primarily objects of our perception, but rather the 
results of perception.94 That is, for this violence to exist, one that embeds itself in musical 
structure, it needs a reader-listener, which returns us to the concern of perception. Fraktur 
reflects on its own production as a result of reading and hearing.  
As we have seen, Jünger presents violence as an autonomous natural phenomenon 
independent of text or reader. Brecht, while stressing the constructivist nature of 
violence, wishes to exercise analytical skills; yet the workout trains the emotional body as 
much as the mind, which rejects the economy of violence. Brecht’s reader either practices 
representations of violence or generates sympathy. By contrast, the reader's empathy in 
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Berlin Alexanderplatz is not with the characters but with the book's materiality that 
collapses meaning and form, book and reader, which I have tried to capture with the term 
Fraktur.95 The novel turns the story of Franz Biberkopf into an event in which the 
distinction between narrated plot and the narrated reader disintegrates.  
 
It remains an open question whether narrative must be perceived according to 
natural structures. To argue that narrative is categorized according to natural schemata is 
not far from arguing that readers’ reception of violence is structured in the same way that 
it would be were it a question of perceiving real violence. The conjectures regarding 
consciousness in cognitive poetics depend on either biology or inherent functions of 
language according to cognitive linguistics, perfectly legitimate bases for investigating 
art.96 Yet the rooting of aesthetic reception in biology demands an explanatory model 
strong enough to account for the presence of fiction at the all stages of art, not merely as 
at the stages of drive or imitation. At stake too is the status of the decidability between 
narrated story and narrated reader. For what is experienced is not merely a world of 
possibly real representations. Experienced also is the impact of the observer and how 
reading becomes a part of the represented.  
What has been forgotten or insufficiently received is Berlin Alexanderplatz’s 
insight: by inserting herself into the gaps of narrative the reader becomes part of the 
scene. This is also to say that reading in this novel is always accompanied by a second 
order of reflection, one that observes (naturally?) the unnaturality of its observations. The 
reader becomes a witness and enters into narration only when she attempts to tell a story 
about the impact of what she reads.  
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In the case of such a prose-work as Berlin Alexanderplatz, in which, in 
Benjamin’s words, “The waves of incident and reflection . . . sweep over the reader and 
destabilize his comfort to this degree,”97 an animating embodied consciousness must 
disconnect and integrate textual elements. A central feature of Berlin Alexanderplatz is its 
contingency, the sense that its particles could be different than how they presently appear. 
Sampling possible connections that readers are likely to anticipate (which anticipation we 
can explain by way of cognition or convention), the novel marks them as previewed or 
“typical” without completing the connection. Able to fold violence into a plot only with 
intensely active engagement, readers must trace violence to fill in the gaps, just as they 
trace the novel's particular genetic construction. As a result, their own efforts at 
presenting violence in the act of perceiving—that is, the production of communication—
are reintroduced into the object of reading.  
Plot is the soul of tragedy, wrote Aristotle; likewise, story is the bread and butter 
of reading. Both are insufficient for grasping Berlin Alexanderplatz. By complicating 
story with volatile events of reading, the novel focuses the reader-listener at once on the 
terrain of the metropolis as mediated and at the same time on the act of reading as an 
affine phenomenon. Diffused into an active, searching perception, the violent plot is 
indeed locatable but only on the basis of violence as plot. For Berlin Alexanderplatz does 
indeed “report the story of Franz Biberkopf,” as the novel's first line has it—if by report 
we mean that Franz is narrated in the way that readers are narrated (both as narrated 
addressees and constructing narrators). To “listen to this, and to meditate on” this 
narration is to narrate our own violence.98 In this way, at least, readers of the novel 
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resemble its protagonist: they, “like Franz Biberkopf, live in a human skin, and, like this 
Franz Biberkopf, ask more of life than a piece of bread and butter.” 
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